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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Christopher C. Tapp appeals from the district court’s order summarily 
dismissing his second successive petition for post-conviction relief.  Tapp 
contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that the state 
withheld exculpatory evidence.   
 
Statement Of Facts, Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings (Docket 
No. 25295), And Course Of Prior Post-Conviction Proceedings (Docket Nos. 
35536, 40197, 41056)  
 
 The state charged Tapp with, and a jury convicted him of, first-degree 
murder, rape, and a weapon enhancement for use of a deadly weapon during the 
commission of the murder and rape of Angie Dodge.  State v. Tapp, 136 Idaho 
354, 33 P.3d 828 (Ct. App. 2001) (“Tapp I”).  The court imposed a unified life 
sentence, plus 15 years, with 35 years fixed for first degree murder, and a 
concurrent unified 20-year sentence, with 10 years fixed, for rape.  Id. at 358, 33 
P.3d at 832.  
 On direct appeal, Tapp claimed the statements he made to law 
enforcement should have been suppressed for a variety of reasons and that his 
sentences are excessive.  Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 358, 33 P.3d at 832.  Although 
the Court of Appeals found that some of Tapp’s statements should have been 
suppressed, it ultimately denied relief on Tapp’s claims and affirmed his 
judgment of conviction.  See generally Tapp I, supra. 
Following his direct appeal, Tapp filed a petition for post-conviction relief, 
which the district court summarily dismissed.  Tapp v. State, Docket No. 35536, 
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2010 WL 9586518 (Idaho App. March 31, 2010) (“Tapp II”).  On appeal from the 
dismissal of his first post-conviction petition, Tapp contended: 
(1) had his defense counsel presented additional facts regarding 
the circumstances surrounding the confession made on January 
29,  he would have demonstrated that Tapp was in custody at the 
time, and that the confession was obtained in violation of Tapp’s 
Miranda[1] rights, (2) had counsel presented information as to 
Tapp’s mental health he would have demonstrated involuntariness 
of his confession, and (3) had counsel called Tapp to testify at trial 
he would have explained how his confession was coerced.  Tapp 
also assert[ed] that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
anticipate that th[e] Court [of Appeals] would find certain statements 
suppressible and argue from that determination that the statements 
made on January 29 were fruit of the poisonous tree. 
 
Tapp II at *3.   
 With respect to Tapp’s claim that counsel was ineffective in relation to the 
presentation of evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding Tapp’s 
January 29 confession, the Court of Appeals remanded for the district court to 
consider “the alleged additional facts” because the district court failed to do so 
when it summarily dismissed this claim.  Tapp II at *6.  The Court of Appeals 
reached the same result with respect to Tapp’s claim that counsel was ineffective 
in not presenting additional information to support his assertion that his 
confession was involuntary.  Id. at *7-9.  The Court of Appeals rejected Tapp’s 
substantive right to testify claim because the claim was raised for the first time on 
appeal, and the Court affirmed the summary dismissal of his claim that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to call him to testify.  Id. at *9-11.  The Court of Appeals 
also affirmed the dismissal of Tapp’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
claim.  Id. at *11-14. 
                                                 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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 On remand, the district court again dismissed Tapp’s ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims.  Tapp v. State, Docket No. 40197, 2013 WL 
6171026 *5-6 (Idaho App. Nov. 21, 2013) (“Tapp III”).  “Tapp appealed from the 
subsequently entered judgment dismissing his post-conviction action” and, 
“[t]hree days after filing the notice of appeal,” Tapp filed a petition in his post-
conviction case requesting DNA testing pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902.  Id. at *6.  
Specifically, Tapp requested “further DNA testing of semen recovered from the 
crime scene.”  Id.  “The State filed a response stating that it did not object to the 
request for further DNA testing, but it requested that a specific laboratory in 
Texas do the testing.”  Id.  The district court denied Tapp’s DNA petition and 
Tapp appealed that order while his post-conviction appeal was still pending.  Id.  
 On appeal following remand of Tapp’s initial post-conviction petition, and 
on appeal from the denial of Tapp’s request for additional DNA testing, the Court 
of Appeals concluded “Tapp’s challenges to the district court’s judgment granting 
summary dismissal are without merit.”  Tapp III at *11.  With respect to Tapp’s 
DNA petition, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of the 
petition on the grounds that the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider 
the petition because it was filed, in the post-conviction case, after Tapp already 
appealed.  Id. at *12 (relying on I.A.R. 13(b)).  However, the Court’s “affirmance 
[was] without prejudice to Tapp’s ability to re-plead his request for DNA testing in 
a procedurally correct manner.”  Id.  
 Tapp filed a “successive post-conviction petition while the initial appeal in 
his first post-conviction case was pending.”  Tapp v. State, Docket No. 41056, 
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2014 WL 4177464 *3 (Idaho App. Nov. 21, 2013) (“Tapp IV”).  Tapp’s successive 
“petition alleged Tapp was deprived of his right to testify.”  Id.  “In contrast to 
Tapp’s first petition,” Tapp’s successive petition “alleged a direct violation of his 
Sixth Amendment right, as opposed to the ineffective assistance claim brought 
previously.”  Id.  The Court of Appeals did not address the merits of Tapp’s 
successive post-conviction claim because “Tapp failed to assert any sufficient 
reason for filing a successive post-conviction petition.”  Id. at *4.  Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s summary dismissal of Tapp’s 
successive petition.  Id.   
 Tapp, with the assistance of counsel, filed a second successive post-
conviction petition on September 6, 2012.  (R., pp.7-15.)  In his second 
successive petition, Tapp alleged the state failed to disclose exculpatory 
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  (R., pp.9-15.)  
The state filed an answer and a separate motion for summary dismissal with a 
supporting memorandum.  (R., pp.23-25, 31-154, 160-161.)  The district court 
held a hearing, granted the state’s motion, and entered Judgment dismissing 
Tapp’s second successive petition.  (R., pp.214, 216; see generally Tr.2, pp.54-
67.)  Tapp filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.221-223.)           
                                                 
2 There are two transcripts included in the record on appeal – one for a status 
conference on January 8, 2015, and one combined transcript for several 
hearings including the summary dismissal hearing.  All “Tr.” references in this 
brief are to the latter.   
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ISSUES 
 Tapp has filed two separate briefs on appeal, raising the following issues:   
Did the court err in summarily dismissing the Brady claim as 
the withheld evidence was exculpatory in that it pointed to someone 
unrelated to Mr. Tapp as the killer, thus discrediting Mr. Tapp’s 
statements to the police and bolstering his alibi defense, and 
material as its admission would have resulted in an acquittal at 
trial? 
 
(Appellant’s Opening Brief (“Opening Brief”), p.9.) 
 Is the district court’s finding that the withheld evidence was 
not exculpatory under Brady v. Maryland, in light of the defense at 
the criminal trial, not supported by sufficient evidence in the record 
as it is based upon the court’s prior knowledge of the criminal court 
proceedings, and the transcript of the criminal trial was not taken 
judicial notice of, was not introduced as an exhibit, and was not 
filed with the state’s answer as required by I.C. § 19-4906(a)? 
 
(Appellant’s Supplemental Brief (“Supplemental Brief”), p.3.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 Has Tapp failed to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
his second successive post-conviction petition? 
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ARGUMENT 
Tapp Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing 
His Second Successive Post-Conviction Petition 
 
A. Introduction 
Tapp contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his second 
successive post-conviction petition.  Specifically, Tapp contends the district court 
erred in concluding Tapp failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that 
would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on his Brady claim.  (Opening Brief, 
pp.10-23.)  Alternatively, Tapp contends “there was no evidence in the record 
from which the court could make a determination whether or not the evidence 
was exculpatory or material under Brady” because the state failed to provide a 
transcript of Tapp’s underlying criminal trial.  (Supplemental Brief, pp.4-7.)  
Tapp’s claims fail.  A review of the record and the applicable law supports the 
district court’s conclusion that Tapp failed to meet his burden of alleging a prima 
facie Brady violation and, as such, summary dismissal was appropriate.          
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court “will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on 
the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and 
will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party.”  Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010).     
 7 
The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the testimony are 
matters within the discretion of the trial court.  Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, 
702, 274 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted).  
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found.  State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).   
 
C. Tapp Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Second Successive Post-Conviction Petition 
 
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the prosecution has a 
duty to disclose evidence that is both favorable to the defense and material to 
either guilt or punishment.  “Proving a Brady violation requires a three-part 
showing.”  State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 389, 313 P.3d 1, 45 (2013).  First, 
“[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is 
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching.”  Id. (quotations and citations omitted).  
Second, the “evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully 
or inadvertently.”  Id.  Third, “prejudice must have ensued.”  Id.  Thus, in order to 
be entitled to a post-conviction evidentiary hearing on an alleged Brady violation, 
a petitioner must allege a genuine issue of material fact on each element of his 
claim.  Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 383, 313 P.3d at 39.  In determining whether a 
petitioner has satisfied his burden of alleging a genuine issue of material fact 
entitling him to an evidentiary hearing, the court considers “the pleadings, 
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depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file,” and “view[s] the 
facts in the light most favorable to the applicant.”  Id. (citing Ridgley v. State, 
148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (2010)). 
The district court correctly concluded that Tapp was not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on his Brady claim.  A review of “the pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions together with any affidavits on file,” supports this conclusion.  
Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 383, 313 P.3d at 39. 
The “pleadings” in a civil case include the complaint and the answer.  
I.R.C.P. 7(a).  In the context of a post-conviction action, the petition is the 
equivalent of a complaint.  In his second successive petition, Tapp alleged that, 
after his conviction, and through his “own investigation, and the investigation of 
the Idaho Innocence Project, information surfaced from at least two witnesses 
who provided and / or had the ability to provide exculpatory or mitigating 
information which was in the knowledge or control of the Idaho Falls Police and 
not turned over to the Defense.”  (R., p.9 ¶ 11.)  Those witnesses are John 
Browning and Gentri Nicole Morris Goff, both of whom provided affidavits, which 
Tapp submitted in support of his second successive petition.  (R. pp.9-11 ¶¶ 12-
13, pp.17-18 (Browning Affidavit), pp.19-20 (Goff Affidavit).)  Browning and Goff 
both averred that (1) “On June 13, 1996 at approximately 3:00 a.m. a man known 
to [them] to be a tenant of the Woodruff Apartments in Idaho Falls knocked on 
the door to [their] apartment” (R., p.17 ¶ 1, p.19 ¶ 1); (2) that man had “blood on 
his clothes, scratches on his face and a rug burn” on his chin (R., p.17 ¶ 4, p.19 
¶ 3); (3) he asked to use the bathroom so he could “wash up” (R., p.17 ¶ 7, p.19 
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¶ 6); (4) he made them “feel very uncomfortable” (R., p.17 ¶ 9, p.19 ¶ 7); (5) he 
was told he “could use the hose outside,” but “could not come inside” (R., p.17 ¶ 
10, p.19 ¶ 8); (6) he “proceeded to explain . . . why he had the injuries and blood 
on his clothes without any prompting” (R., p.17 ¶ 11, p.19 ¶ 9); (7) Browning gave 
“the man a cigarette and asked him to leave” (R., p.17 ¶ 13, p.19 ¶ 11); (8) they 
“had seen the man around the apartment complex on several occasions” and the 
man would “bum cigarettes” from them (R., p.17 ¶¶ 16-17, p.19 ¶¶ 13-14)3; and 
(9) “he drove a motorcycle that had speakers bungee-corded to the back of the 
motorcycle and [were] spray painted with black paint” (R., p.17 ¶ 19, p.20 ¶ 16). 
Browning additionally averred that he “was picked up by one detective that 
was not in uniform, in an unmarked vehicle while [Browning] was working one 
day [at a Chevron] in September 1996.”  (R., p.18 ¶¶ 21-22.)  Browning “gave the 
detective an oral statement of the events that happened in the early morning 
hours of June 13, 1996 and identified the person as being 5’6”, 100 lbs., long 
blond hair, dressed like a cowboy, [who] drove a Honda motorcycle with 
homemade speakers.”  (R., p.18 ¶ 23.)  Tapp alleged that the information 
Browning provided to the detective “was never turned over to the defense.” 
(R., p.10 ¶ 12.)       
Goff, however, was not interviewed until July 31, 2012, at which time she 
was given a photograph that included a man that she “recognized” as the “same 
man that came to [her] apartment on June 13, 1996 at approximately 3 a.m.” 
(R., p.20 ¶¶ 18-23.)  Tapp alleged that “[t]he police knew or should have known 
                                                 
3 Browning averred he had seen the man “after that night,” whereas Goff averred 
she had seen him “prior to that night.”  (R., p.17 ¶ 16, p.19 ¶ 13). 
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that Mrs. Goff had information which could have corroborated Mr. Browning’s 
story.”  (R., p.11 ¶ 13.)   
Although neither Browning nor Goff ever identified the man who came to 
their apartment by name, Tapp alleged in his second successive petition that “a 
photograph of Jeff Smith was shown to Mrs. Goff” and “Mrs. Goff recognized the 
man in the photograph to be the same man that came to her apartment on June 
13, 1996 at approximately 3:00 a.m.”  (R., p.11 ¶ 13.)  Tapp then alleged that 
“Jeff Smith is mentioned as a suspect to Angie Dodge’s murder on at least ten 
different dates in Detective Ken Brown’s police report narrative.  At the very least 
this person’s identity should have been turned over to the Defense.”  (R., p.11 ¶ 
13.)   
After outlining the content of Browning’s and Goff’s affidavits, Tapp’s 
second successive petition has a section titled, “Applicable Law,” followed by a 
section titled, “Argument.”  (R., pp.11, 13 (capitalization altered).)  Tapp’s 
“Argument” section alleges: 
22.  Upon filing of the original charges in early February 1997, the 
State had a duty to immediately search her files and those of law 
enforcement to discover favorable and material evidence for the 
defense and to disclose it.  The information was not disclosed.  It 
was only by happenstance that the Petitioner came across this 
information at all.  
 
23.  It turns out that the withheld information included the possibility 
of another person who could have perpetrated this crime.  Likewise 
the Defense anticipates that more evidence will be discovered that 
was not turned over prior to the original trial once the defense has 
unfettered access to the police and states [sic] files.  Thus the 
evidence that the state has failed to disclose which has been 
discovered by the defense through its own investigation is merely 
the tip of the iceberg.  This mitigating and or exculpatory evidence 
is highly relevant to the underlying facts of the case.  
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24.  This information would be admissible, both at preliminary 
hearing and at trial, as relevant evidence under IRE 402, evidence 
of an alternate perpetrator and possible impeachment evidence. 
 
25.  Under the cases of Avelar[4] and Brady and other authority as 
cited above, this information was favorable to the Defense and 
exculpatory in nature, and thus, was required to be disclosed to the 
defense prior to the trial. 
 
26.  In this case the Prosecutor withheld the above evidence and 
hogtied the defense to investigate only those individuals who would 
be favorable to the prosecution’s case.  This happened despite the 
fact that it had been requested by Defense counsel on a number of 
occasions, and despite the duty of automatic disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence that arises under Idaho Criminal Rule 16. 
 
27.  This evidence would have been properly admissible at the trial.  
In other words, it is the right of the defense to attack the theory of 
the prosecution’s case with alternate theories and attack the 
credibility of witnesses and show that the police failed to follow up 
on leads and find the true perpetrators of the crime.  The State’s 
case was purely circumstantial, and no physical evidence was 
produced to prove Mr. Tapp was even at the scene of the crime 
much less the perpetrator.   
 
28.  The State’s failure to turn over information was a violation of 
Mr. Tapp’s fundamental Constitutional rights to due process and to 
a fair trial.  Thus his felony convictions should be vacated.   
 
29.  When the matter proceeded to trial the withheld evidence 
would have been relevant and therefore should have been admitted 
at trial. 
 
(R., pp.13-15 ¶¶ 22-29 (emphasis original).)   
 The state filed an Answer, which included the following “defenses”:  (1) 
“Some or all claims may be barred by the Statute of Limitations I.C. § 19-4902”; 
(2) “This is a successive petition and should be dismissed”; (3) “Petition fails to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted”; (4) “Jeff Smith’s DNA was tested 
                                                 
4 State v. Avelar, 124 Idaho 317, 859 P.2d 353 (Ct. App. 1993).  (See R., p.11 ¶ 
14.) 
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in 1996.  It does not match the unknown sample”; (5) “All information known to 
the State was given to trial counsel”; and (6) “This case number is currently on 
appeal and the court lacks jurisdiction.”  (R., p.25.)  The state also filed a motion 
for summary dismissal and a supporting memorandum.  (R., pp.31-154, 160-
161.)  The state’s motion asserted “[n]o genuine issue of material fact exists and 
the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law” (R., p.160), and the state’s 
memorandum addressed the three-part test for an alleged Brady violation 
(R., pp.32-35).  In support of its motion, the state provided a Forensic Case 
Report, which indicated that Jeffrey Smith’s DNA did not match the DNA 
evidence collected at the murder scene (R., p.37 (“Exhibit A”); police reports, 
which included information detailing the investigation of Jeff Smith as a potential 
suspect, as well as information detailing the investigation of other suspects and 
the interviews of several individuals (R., pp.38-78 (“Exhibit B”), pp.79-120 
(“Exhibit C”)), and discovery responses filed by the state in 1997 in Tapp’s 
criminal case, which list numerous documents that were disclosed to the defense 
(R., pp.121-153 (“Exhibit D”)).  
 After the state filed its Answer, Tapp filed a motion for discovery. 
(R., pp.27-29.)  The district court partially granted Tapp’s motion, authorizing him 
to “submit requests for production of documents to Respondent regarding police 
records and other documents relating to the investigation of Jeff Smith and the 
possibility that Smith was involved in the subject crime.”  (R., p.163.)  The court 
initially denied Tapp’s request to conduct depositions (R., p.191), but later 
granted Tapp’s request to depose Detectives Ken Brown and Phil Grimes as to 
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what the detectives “actually knew” (R., pp.193-195, 202; see also Tr., p.50, 
Ls.5-9).  It appears those depositions occurred on October 3, 2013.  (See R., p.4 
(entry dated 9/24/2013).)   
 Nearly 18 months after the depositions, the court held a hearing on the 
state’s motion for summary dismissal.  (See R., p.213.)  The record does not 
include either deposition transcript, nor did Tapp submit any additional evidence 
to support his Brady claim.  (See generally R.)  At the summary dismissal 
hearing, both parties presented oral argument, after which the court dismissed 
Tapp’s second successive petition.  (See generally Tr., pp.54-67.)  The district 
court stated its reasons for dismissing Tapp’s Brady claim as follows: 
Well, a Brady violation in this case is limited to the alleged Brady 
violation.  That’s pretty well defined by the Courts, and it requires all 
of three elements in order to present a prima facie case.  So I’m 
looking at that, and I’m required to go based upon what’s in the 
record before me in this case.  And so I -- I’m looking at the 
evidence.  
 
 And I guess the first issue would be, well, was the evidence 
exculpatory.  And this is the problem that I come back to; and it’s a 
-- I think it’s the issue that’s come up in other proceedings as well 
on this matter is, okay, well, let’s say Jeff Smith was complicit in 
this crime and was part of the prosecution.  How does that then 
affect the prosecution of Christopher Tapp and the ultimate 
outcome?  Because the State’s theory all along was, he did not act 
alone, that there was somebody else there. 
 
 So if the evidence did indicate Jeff Smith was there and that 
he should have been part of the prosecution and that had they 
turned over, I guess, information regarding Browning identifying 
what later turned out to be Jeff Smith, how does that change 
anything?  I just don’t see how it does.  The conviction was not 
based upon DNA.  It was not based upon identification of anybody 
else involved.  It was based upon the confession and certain 
circumstantial evidence.  Smith’s involvement or noninvolvement, 
I’m just not seeing how that exculpates Christopher Tapp. 
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 Looking at the other elements, was something suppressed.  
It’s one thing to say the State didn’t turn over information.  It’s 
another thing to say the State didn’t generate information and then 
turn it over to the Defense.  They don’t have an obligation to do the 
latter.  They disclose what they know.  Certainly Jeff Smith’s 
involvement or the suspicion that he was a person of interest, that 
was evidence from the police records.  I guess that -- to me that’s 
not quite as clear-cut an issue, and perhaps that’s not a basis for 
summary dismissal. 
 
 But then I look at the third element, which to me is 
interrelated with the first element; and that’s, okay, was there 
prejudice from the nondisclosure.  Even assuming a nondisclosure 
regarding Browning, what effect did that have on the ultimate 
conviction?  Well, it certainly would have had an effect on Smith in 
a prosecution as to another participant of the crime.  How does that 
affect the basis for which Christopher Tapp was convicted?  I don’t 
see how it has an effect.  I just don’t think that makes any 
difference.   
 
 So two of the three elements I just don’t feel are affected by 
the alleged failure to disclose information regarding Smith and 
Browning.  I just don’t think the record supports a Brady violation 
under these -- based on what I have in front of me, so I am granting 
the motion to dismiss. 
 
(Tr., p.64, L.17 – p.66, L.14.)      
A review of Tapp’s second successive petition, his affidavits, and the 
state’s answer reveals there was no genuine issue of material fact warranting an 
evidentiary hearing on Tapp’s Brady claim.  First, Tapp failed to allege a prima 
facie case that either Browning or Goff had exculpatory information.  As noted, 
both individuals provided affidavits relating an unusual encounter they claimed to 
have had with an unnamed man at approximately 3:00 a.m. on June 13, 1996, 
which included allegations that the man had blood on his clothes, scratches on 
his face, and a rug burn on his chin.  (R., pp.17, 19.)  However, nothing in Tapp’s 
second successive petition, or in the affidavits themselves, provides any 
 15 
connection between the encounter described by Browning and Goff and the 
murder for which Tapp was convicted.  Although the Court of Appeals’ opinion in 
Tapp I recounts that the victim was raped and murdered “in the early morning of 
June 13, 1996,” 136 Idaho at 357, 33 P.3d at 831, and portions of the underlying 
criminal record would likely reflect the same had they been submitted to the 
district court, nothing in Tapp’s second successive petition reflects that fact, nor 
do the affidavits.  Compare Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 650, 873 P.2d 898, 
904 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding that petitioner failed to show that proposed testimony 
from witnesses “would have raised a viable alibi defense” because “[n]either the 
criminal complaint, which would reveal the time periods during which the criminal 
act was alleged to have occurred, nor the transcript of the criminal trial, which 
would reflect the evidence offered by the prosecution to show the time and place 
of the offense, were placed in evidence in the present proceeding”). 
Moreover, nothing in the affidavits exculpates Tapp.  Neither Browning nor 
Goff claimed that the man who came to their apartment admitted he murdered 
someone, nor is there any allegation in either affidavit linking the man to Angie 
Dodge.  Rather, it is pure speculation that the man who allegedly spoke with 
Browning and Goff “at approximately 3:00 a.m. on June 13, 1996” murdered 
anyone.  Speculation is insufficient for purposes of establishing a genuine issue 
of material fact that the evidence at issue is exculpatory.  See Finholt v. Cresto, 
143 Idaho 894, 897, 155 P.3d 695, 698 (2006) (citations omitted) (“Circumstantial 
evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact.  However, while reasonable 
inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, the non-moving party 
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cannot rest upon mere speculation.”); East Lizard Butte Water Corp. v. Howell, 
122 Idaho 686, 688, 837 P.2d 812, 814 (Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted) (“to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party’s case must 
consist of more than speculation; it must create a genuine issue regarding a 
material fact”).     
Tapp also failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact that the state 
withheld Browning or Goff as potential witnesses.  Indeed, Goff’s affidavit reveals 
that she never gave “an oral or written statement to the police.”  (R., p.20 ¶ 19.)  
The state cannot disclose information it does not have.  As for Browning, while 
his affidavit alleges he “was picked up by one detective that was not in uniform, 
in an unmarked vehicle” one day while he was working at a Chevron, at which 
time he “gave the detective an oral statement of the events that happened in the 
early morning hours of June 13, 1996,” and provided a description of the man 
who came to his apartment (R., p.18 ¶¶ 22-23), this was insufficient for purposes 
of establishing a genuine issue of material fact that law enforcement withheld 
evidence in Tapp’s criminal case because Browning provides zero context for his 
alleged conversation with some unidentified detective.  For example, nowhere in 
his affidavit does Browning allege that the detective he spoke with was 
investigating the murder of Angie.  Browning also does not explain how the 
detective identified him as a potential witness, or provide any description of the 
detective, much less a name, which would allow the state the ability to even 
respond to the allegation that the individual was an agent of the state.  As 
alleged, the unnamed detective Browning spoke to could have been investigating 
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any offense.  Further, the state’s answer includes a specific assertion that “[a]ll 
information known to the State was given to trial counsel.”  (R., p.25.)  Tapp 
provided no evidence to rebut this assertion, even after he was permitted 
discovery, including depositions of the investigating detectives.5   
Finally, Tapp failed to allege a genuine issue of fact with respect to the 
prejudice prong of Brady.  Although not entirely clear, Tapp’s allegations of 
prejudice appear to be that he had “the right” “to attack the theory of the 
prosecution’s case with alternate theories and attack the credibility of witnesses 
and show that the police failed to follow up on leads and find the true 
perpetrators of the crime.”  (R., pp.14-15 ¶ 27.)  Tapp further alleged the “State’s 
case was purely circumstantial, and no physical evidence was produced to prove 
[he] was even at the scene of the crime much less the perpetrator.”  (R., p.15 ¶ 
27.)  Finally, Tapp alleged “the withheld evidence would have been relevant and 
therefore should have been admitted.”  (R., p.15 ¶ 29.)  These allegations are, at 
best, bare and conclusory.  “Bare and conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by 
any fact, are inadequate to entitle an applicant to an evidentiary hearing.”  
LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing 
Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494, 497, 887 P.2d 39, 42 (Ct. App. 1994)).     
To avoid summary dismissal in relation to the prejudice prong of Brady, 
Tapp was required to allege facts that would show that, without whatever 
admissible evidence was set forth in Browning’s affidavit, he did not receive a fair 
trial, “understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”  Grube v. 
                                                 
5 Materials beyond the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits also support a 
conclusion that the state disclosed numerous police reports.  (R., pp.38-153.) 
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State, 134 Idaho 24, 33-34, 995 P.2d 794, 803-804 (2000) (quotations and 
citation omitted).  Tapp failed to do so.  Although Tapp, on appeal, details the 
evidence presented at trial and why he believes he was prejudiced by the 
absence of testimony consistent with Browning’s affidavit (Opening Brief, pp.10-
23), these assertions appear nowhere in his second successive petition 
(R., pp.7-15).  Indeed, other than referring to the state’s case as “circumstantial” 
and alleging there was a lack of “physical evidence” that he “was even at the 
crime scene much less the perpetrator,” Tapp made no allegations as to what the 
evidence was and he made no factual allegations to support the conclusion that 
the man referred to in Browning’s affidavit “was even at the crime scene much 
less the perpetrator.”  (R., pp.14-15.)  As such, there was no genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the prejudice component of Tapp’s Brady claim. 
Cf. Roman, 125 Idaho at 650, 873 P.2d at 904 (without the trial transcript, court 
could not conclude proposed testimony of alibi witnesses was “even relevant, 
much less conceivably exculpatory”).  
As noted, Tapp’s argument on appeal centers largely around a lengthy 
discussion of the evidence presented at trial.  (Opening Brief, pp.10-23.)  
However, the Idaho Supreme Court twice rejected Tapp’s request to take judicial 
notice of the trial transcript.  Tapp initially requested judicial notice of the Court’s 
“own files and records in his three previous appeals.”  (Motion to Take Judicial 
Notice, dated March 22, 2016.)  The Court denied the motion without prejudice 
and asked Tapp “to identify the specific documents this Court is asked to take 
judicial notice of and specifically whether the district court was asked to take 
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judicial notice of the same documents.”  (Order Denying Motion to Take Judicial 
Notice Without Prejudice, dated April 1, 2016.)  Tapp then filed a Renewed 
Motion to Take Judicial Notice and specifically requested “the Court to take 
judicial notice of the transcripts prepared for the direct appeal in the criminal 
case.”  (Renewed Motion to Take Judicial Notice, dated April 7, 2016.)  In his 
renewed motion, Tapp acknowledged that neither he nor the state “asked the 
district court to take judicial notice of these transcripts,” and that neither “party 
introduce[d] the transcripts as an exhibit,” but because the “district court relied 
upon its recollection of the trial proceedings” in dismissing Tapp’s Brady claim, 
judicial notice was appropriate “[i]n order for th[e] Court to review that decision.”  
(Id.)  The Court denied Tapp’s renewed motion.  (Order Denying Renewed 
Motion to Take Judicial Notice, dated April 27, 2016.)   
In light of the Court’s denial of his request for judicial notice, Tapp filed a 
motion to file a supplemental brief in order to “augment the argument in the 
opening brief with a discussion of how there was an insufficient record before the 
district court to determine whether there had been a violation of Brady . . ..”  
(Motion for Permission to Augment the Argument in the Opening Brief, dated 
May 3, 2016.)  The Court granted Tapp’s motion to augment with his 
Supplemental Brief.  (Order Granting Motion to Augment, dated May 11, 2016.)     
 In his Supplemental Brief, Tapp contends the district court erred in 
summarily dismissing his Brady claim because, he argues, “there was no 
evidence in the record from which the court could make a determination whether 
or not the evidence was exculpatory or material under Brady.”  (Supplemental 
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Brief, p.5.)  While a district court may only rely on the “pleadings, depositions and 
admissions together with any affidavits on file,” Dunlap, supra, rather than its 
memory of prior proceedings, Tapp’s argument reveals the defects in his 
pleading, not an error by the district court.  It was Tapp’s burden to allege facts 
and provide evidence to support his Brady claim in order to avoid summary 
dismissal; the lack of such evidence, as detailed above, is precisely why 
summary dismissal was appropriate.  This is true regardless of whether the 
district court improperly considered its knowledge, which was undoubtedly at 
least partly attributable to the parties’ arguments inviting the court to do so 
(Tr., pp.54-63), in deciding that Tapp’s second successive petition should be 
dismissed.   
Tapp tries to avoid the defects in his petition and affidavits by relying on 
I.C. § 19-4906(a), which provides, in relevant part:  “If the application is not 
accompanied by the record of the proceedings challenged therein, the 
respondent shall file with its answer the record or portions thereof that are 
material to the questions raised in the application.”  Tapp argues that, by failing 
to “provide the record of the criminal case trial to the district court,” “the state 
violated its duty under I.C. § 19-4906)(a) [sic].”  (Supplemental Brief, p.5.)  This 
argument ignores the fact that it was Tapp’s duty, in the first instance, to attach 
“[a]ffidavits, records, or other evidence supporting [his] allegations” to his second 
successive petition, or “recite why they are not attached.”  I.C. § 19-4903.  Tapp 
did not do so; nor did he support his Brady claim with sufficient factual allegations 
and evidence to avoid summary dismissal.     
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Moreover, Tapp cites no authority for the proposition that the state’s failure 
to provide the record is a complaint that can be raised for the first time on appeal, 
much less that the state’s failure to provide the record is a basis for finding error 
in the district court’s determination that a petitioner failed to meet his burden of 
alleging a genuine issue of material fact.  As noted in Roman, I.C. § 19-4906 
does not “reliev[e] an applicant of the consequence of failing to place in evidence 
a transcript essential to prove the applicant’s claim where, as here, the applicant 
made no effort to compel action by the state or to otherwise arrange for the filing 
of the transcript.”  125 Idaho at 648 n.3, 873 P.2d at 902 n.3.                    
Tapp has failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his second 
successive post-conviction petition.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
summary dismissal of Tapp’s second successive petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
 DATED this 24th day of August, 2016. 
 
     
 /s/ Jessica M. Lorello_______________ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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